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Abstract: In contrast to the usual belief, we show that entry in the final goods market 
increases profits of the incumbent final goods producers if there is free entry in the input 
market and the final goods are sufficiently differentiated. Thus, we extend Matsushima 
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Profit raising entry in a vertical structure 
 
1. Introduction 
It is generally believed that entry of new firms reduces profits of the incumbent firms 
and encourages the incumbents to adopt entry deterring strategies. In contrast, we show 
that, if there is free entry in the input markets, entry in the final goods market increases 
profits of the incumbent final goods producers if the final goods are sufficiently 
differentiated. This holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final 
goods market. 
The reason for our result is as follows. For a given input price, entry in the final 
goods market reduces the profits of the incumbent final goods producers by increasing 
competition. However, entry in the final goods market induces entry in the input market 
and reduces the input price, which tends to increase the profits of the incumbent final 
goods producers. If the final goods are sufficiently differentiated, entry does not 
increase competition in the final goods market significantly, but it helps to reduce the 
input price, thus creating profit raising entry. 
There are empirical evidences supporting the mechanism underlying our result. 
Friedson and Li (2015) show that more hospitals (the downstream agents) in an area 
attract more local independent medical labs (the upstream agents) providing 
intermediate services, like testing physical samples, to the hospitals (i.e., increased 
“input sharing”) and reduces prices of the intermediate services. Holmes (1999), Fee 
and Thomas (2004)1, and Li (2013) also provide evidences of increased input sharing. 
  Considering free entry in the input market, Matsushima (2006) showed that 
entry in the final goods market increases industry profit but reduces profits of the 
                                                 
1 I thank Shantanu Banerjee for providing me this evidence. 
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incumbent final goods producers.2 We show that his result is due to the assumption of 
homogeneous final goods. If the final goods are sufficiently differentiated, entry 
increases the profits of the incumbents. 
Considering a monopolist input supplier and quantity competition in the final 
goods market, Tyagi (1999) shows that profit raising entry in the final goods market 
occurs if the demand function is sufficiently convex. Like our paper, entry in his paper 
creates the competition effect and the input-price effect, but the input-price effect in his 
paper is different from ours. Due to the competition effect, for a given input price, entry 
reduces the outputs of the incumbents, increases total final goods production, and 
reduces the profits of the incumbents. However, entry increases input demand and the 
monopolist input supplier increases the input price if the derived input demand is 
generated from a highly convex final goods demand.3 The higher input price tends to 
reduce the output of each final goods producer and total final goods production. Since 
total final goods production is higher under oligopoly compared to industry-profit 
maximising output, the input-price effect tends to increase the profits of the incumbents 
by contracting total final goods production. On the balance, the total-output dampening 
effect resulting from a higher input price dominates the total-output enhancing 
competition effect and creates profit raising entry. Hence, unlike our paper, entry in 
Tyagi (1999) increases the input price and reduces total final goods production, which 
makes the consumers worse off when profit raising entry occurs. Further, unlike Tyagi 
(1999), we consider competition in the input market and show our results under both 
quantity and price competition in the final goods market. 
                                                 
2 Naylor (2002a) also shows the possibility of industry-profit raising entry in a vertical structure. 
3 If the demand curve is highly convex, increased total final goods production following entry reduces 
price of the final goods significantly, which affects rent extraction by the input supplier and encourages 
it to increase the input price to contract total output in the final goods market.  
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 Naylor (2002b) and Mukherjee et al. (2009) also show profit raising entry in a 
vertical structure. Considering firm-union bargaining, Naylor (2002b) shows that profit 
raising entry may occur if the labour unions care sufficiently about wages, but it does 
not happen if the upstream agents give the same weights on price and output, like firms.4 
In a successive oligopoly, Mukherjee et al. (2009) show profit raising entry in the 
presence of asymmetric final goods producers. In contrast, we show profit raising entry 
when the input suppliers put the same weights on price and output, and with symmetric 
final goods producers. 
 Profit raising entry may occur due to other factors, such as  Stackelberg leader-
follower (Pal and Sarkar, 2001 and Mukherjee and Zhao, 2009), vertical product 
differentiation and heterogeneous consumer groups (Ishibashi and Matsushima, 2009), 
innovation by asymmetric cost firms (Ishida et al., 2011), and network externality with 
corporate social responsibility (Fanti and Buccella, 2017). In contrast, we show the 
implications of horizontally differentiated final goods and free entry in the input market. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Consider a successive oligopoly model like Matsushima (2006) with the exception that 
the final goods are horizontally differentiated. There are n final goods producers 
producing horizontally differentiated products by using a critical input produced in an 
oligopolistic input market. Assume that each final goods producer requires one unit of 
input to produce one unit of the final goods. 
While the number of final goods producers are given exogenously, there are 
many input suppliers and free entry in the input market determines the number of active 
input suppliers. If an input supplier enters the market, it incurs a fixed entry cost, K. For 
                                                 
4 Fanti (2014) shows similar results by measuring competition through product differentiation. 
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simplicity, we normalise the marginal cost of input production to 0. There are no other 
costs for input production. We also assume for simplicity that the only cost faced by 
the final goods producers is the price of the input. 








P q g q
=
≠
= − −  , where [0,1]g ∈  is the degree of product differentiation. 
The products are perfect substitutes (isolated) if g = 1 (g = 0).  
 Consider a three-stage game. At stage 1, the input suppliers take the entry 
decision. At stage 2, the input suppliers who entered the market determine their outputs 
like Cournot oligopolists, and the input price, w, is determined. At stage 3, the final 
goods producers determine their outputs like Cournot oligopolists and the profits are 
realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 If m input suppliers enter the market, the ith final goods producer determines its 










Max q g q w q
=
≠
− − − .       (1) 












.        (2) 




















= − − 
 
. The kth input supplier determines its output by maximising 
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The equilibrium input production is 
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The equilibrium profit of the kth input supplier who entered the market is 
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 The free entry equilibrium number of input supplier is given by 
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K <  so that at least one input supplier enters the market for any values of n 
and g. 










.       (6) 
 
Proposition 1: Higher competition in the final goods market reduces the equilibrium 
input price. 




















Given the input price, entry in the final goods market increases the total input 
demand and the profits of the input suppliers, thus encouraging more input suppliers to 
enter the market. Hence, competition in the input market increases and the input price 
falls. 
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, since the minimum value of 1n =  











K < . Since the right-
hand side of (8) is continuous in g, it suggests that if the final goods are sufficiently 
differentiated, entry in the final goods market increases profits of the incumbent final 
goods producers. 
 However, if 1g = , we get 
























( )2 1 1 4 0Kn n n + − − <  . This is like Matsushima (2006), suggesting that if the final 
goods are close substitutes, entry in the final goods market decreases profits of the 
incumbent final goods producers. 
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 The following proposition summarise the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 2: If the final goods are sufficiently differentiated (close substitutes), entry 
in the final goods market increases (decreases) the profits of the incumbent final goods 
producers. 
 
 If the final goods are isolated, entry of a new final goods producer encourages 
entry in the input market, which reduces the input price and increases profits of the final 
goods producers. Since the profits of the final goods producers are continuous on 
product differentiation, the continuity argument suggests that entry of a new final goods 
producer increases profits of the incumbent final goods producers if the final goods are 
sufficiently differentiated. However, if the final goods are close substitutes, higher 
competition following entry dominates the beneficial input-price effect, and entry 
reduces profits of the incumbents. 
As an example, compare the profits of a final goods producers under a 
monopoly and a duopoly final goods market structure. If there is a monopolist final 





Kπ = − . If there are two final goods 























K < , at least one input supplier enters the market for  n = 1 and n = 2. Assuming 
1
10
K = , we plot the difference * *( )
i mo
π π−  in Figure 1, which shows that 
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* *( ) ( )0
i mo
π π− > <  for low (high) values of g, suggesting that profit raising entry occurs 
if the final goods are sufficiently differentiated (close substitutes). 
  
 
Figure 1: * *( )
i mo
π π−  for 
1
10
K =  and [0,1]g ∈  
 
Successive Cournot oligopoly is criticised on the grounds that the outputs of the 
final goods producers are effectively determined by the input market. However, 
Proposition 2 holds even if the final goods market is characterised by Bertrand 




We show that entry in the final goods market increases profits of the incumbent final 
goods producers if there is free entry in the input market and the final goods are 
sufficiently differentiated. The mechanism for our result may have a broader 
applicability. If there are related markets (e.g., the markets for complementary goods), 








entry in one market may affect a related market, which, in turn, may create a beneficial 
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